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whid. are bOUlid to halle la8ti"(l comeqlullee.t hatH! taken
place in the USSR benroth the more obviolU event8.
DEMOGRAPHIC AND ECONOMIC CHANGES IN WAR-TIME USSR
By B. THOMAS
IN order to comprehend the changes in thepopulation and economics of the USSRduring the war years of 1941 to 1945, it is
neccssary briefly to review the changes in
thesc fields which took place in the twenty-four
years of Bolshevist rule preceding the war.
They are characterized by four main facts:
(1) LOSSES IN POI'ULATJON
According to official Soviet statistics, the
population of what is now the Soviet Union
decreaseu from 1917 to 1922 by 10 million
(from 141.7 to 131.7 million). Furthermore,
Soviet stat istics assumed a population figure of
180.7 million for January 1U38, while the census
of January 1939 showed it to be 170.5 million.
The ditJcrence of 10.2 million corresponds more
or Ie s to the cffL'Ct.s of the famine of 1933/34,
which was never admitted officially. If we
take into account the fact that, during these
two periods of lUI i /22 and 1V33/3-l, in addition
to tho act.ual dccrea e in the population the
normal increaso of 2 to 3 million a year was
also nullified, wo arrive at the conclusion that,
lLS a r 1111. of excessive mortality and the
decreased birth rate during the Revolution, tho
Civil War, tho famine of 1921/22, the collec-
tivization, and the famine of 1033/34, the
population inhabiting the soil of tho present
Soviet Union 8utTered a loss of altogether some
25 to 30 million people.
(u) UBj)A~IZATJON
Owing in part to the forced industrialization,
in part to tho mass migrat.ion from the rural
districts which suffcred particularly from the
famine, , an exceedingly rapid process of urban-
iZlltion took place in the Soviet Union. While
Ute urban population of the SSR was almo 1.
tripled from 1920 to Hl39, rising from 1\.1.4 to
55.5 million, the rurlll population remained
pra.cticllUy unchanged; it increased by only 2
per cellt ((rom 112.2 to 114.5 million). Indeed,
in eompnri on to lU2U, when tho rural popllla-
tion reached its highest figure of 126.i million,
it ev n declined by 12.2 million.
(ill) '1.1 .RTLY nITTL'\G CE~TEH OF RAVITY
Assuming tho population figurc for oach of
the various rr.gions of tbe VSSlt to havo been
100 in Hl20, we arrive, according to Soviet
statistics, at the following index figures for tho
growth of the population :
Territory Population ImlOJlJ
1920 1926 1933 1939
European Soviet Union
Foree!. zono 100 121 147 14O
Black Earth zone (mainly
the Ukraine) 100 lOll 112 117
Northorn Cuucasue 100 10·l 111, 121
TrIU1SC8ucasia 100 113 I:n 155
Turkestan 100 110 13·l 158
Western Siberia {incl. Kazak.
stan ami Kirghiz Rep.} 100 112 I"'~ 120~ ..
Eastern Sibcrio. 100 12:1 170 :!It.i
I'lli' East (incl. Yakul. Rep.) 100 114 115 144
Soviet Union total: 100 112 12\l 130
This table shows that three territories (Bln.ck
Earth zone, Northern Caucasus, West~rn 'ibe-
ria) aro considerably below the average rate of
increase, while four territories (Tran. CllIlCl\.sia.,
Turkestan, Eastern Siberia, Sovi 1. :Far East)
are far abot,c the average of the USSR. Tho
proportion of tho European Sovi -1. Union in
the population of the entire Sovi 1. Union ha.;;;
declined from i per cent (1920) to 76 per cent
(1939); that of the non· European • oviet Union
has risen from 22 per cent (H120) to 24 pCl'
cent (HJ39). Deducting the natllral in rt'llSe,
we clln assume that in the years between 1920
and 193\:1 some 2! million peoplo from the
European Soviet Union were resettled in the
non·European areas. As a largo proportion of
t.his figure is made up of deported persons, the
eastern migration of the population, seem on
the whole, was not nearly as great as wa~
generally limed. The industrial develop-
ment of Siberia. during the thirties must thr.re-
fore hONe been effected mainly with the aid of
the native population.
(IV) MELTI~'" I'OT
The elT ct of the changes in the poplliation
stTuetur d.iscu ed uud'r (1) to (Ill) varic<.l in
the dilTcrent parts of th ovict ni n. Tho
greatest 10 s in population was suffered by the
main grain-producing arells-Black Earth zone',
• orthcrn Call I us, We tern 'iberia-I' u e
the struggle first for Bolshevization, til n for
collectivization, assumed a particularly violent
form here. Kazakstan suffered a sinlilar 10
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88 a result of the Bolshevist policy of denomad-
ization, which had a disastrous effect upon
cattle stocks and consequently upon the pop-
ulation. To speak in racial instead of geo-
graphical terms: Ukrainians, Volga-Ut'll1 Tartars,
and Kuaks, i.e., non·Russian elements, were
particularly badly hit.
Urbanization also had a denationalizing
effect on the non-Russian components of the
population, as those Ukrainians and Kuaks
who migrated from their native villages into
the cities fell victim far more rapidly to the
general leveling process than those who re-
mained in the villages.
The shifting of the center of gravity toward
the east also tended to decrease the national
minorities just named. Among them the re-
sistance against Bolshevism waa particularl,}'
vehement; and among the Ukrainians and
Volga-Germans, for instance, tho number of
so-called 1cltla1c8 deported to Siberia was espe-
cially great. Their actual loss waa e,-cn greater
than is revealed by the statistics; for in these
the full extent of the decrease is partially hid-
den by the strong immigration of other, mostly
Russian elements into these a,reas. In order to
influence and educate these minorities in the
Bolshevist sense, it proved necessary to send
millions of Party functionaries, Comsomol exccu-
tives, kolkhoz chiefs, administration officialR,
etc., there, who hclped at least partially to fill
the gaps. The extraordinarily high rates of
growth in Transcaucaaia, Turkestan, ElUltern
Siberia, and the Soviet Far East-all regions
also inhabited by national minorities-are not
t,he result of a natural increase. If thcy were,
these peoples would be miracles of propagation;
the Turkestans would, for exampic, have in-
creased by 4 per cent every year from 1933 to
1939, while the average annual increase for the
whole Soviet Union during the same years
amounted to only 0.07 per cent. No, the un·
O8ual population growth in these territories is,
above all, the result of a considerable immigra-
tion of workmen, technical personnel, and
engineers from other partB to foster the
industrialization of these formerly backward
regions.
We have no exact figures concerning the
movement of population within the various
nationaJities in the immigration areas. But
&88uming that the native population of Turke-
stan has increased at the same rate 88 that of
the whole of the Soviet Union, i.e., by 0.67 per
cent per annum, the natural increase in the
period from 1933 to 1939 would have amounted
to 0.227 million. Since, however, the actual
increase in that period was 1.30 million, we
must conclude that the difference of some 1.133
million migrated there from other partB. So
we find the same phenomenon in all non·Russian
territories with a particularly low lUl well as a
particularly high increase in population: a per-
meation of native with immigrant elements.
SINCE TJtB START 01' TIlE WAR
How WlUl the population trend of the USSR
influenced by the present war? Here we have
above all the gigantic process of evacuation.
which took place in the course of the war ill
four waves of varying extent.
(I) After the OCC'ltpatiQ'l of eastern Polmld.
The first wave occurred after the occupation of
eastern Poland in the autumn of 1939. It will
probably never be known how many civilian
inhabit.ants of these areas were sent oft to the
interior of the USSR. E,'en the Anglo-Saxon
press reckons with 11 to 21 million. A large-
perhaps the largest-proportion of them was
settled in the Altai, on the Siberian·Chinese
border, and various stationssuch NoV08ibirsk and
Tashkent still broadcast Polish programs.
(2) Duri11{J the retreat of the Red Army. The
next wave began in the summer and autumn
of 1941, in part owing to the flight of the
population but chiefly owing to systematic
evacuations combined with a ruthle88 scorched-
earth poliey. To a varying degree it affected
all territories occupied by the German troops
up to the late autumn of 1942: the Ukrainian
areas with some 46 million inhabitants (includ-
ing some 36 million Ukrainians); the entire
White Ruthenian territory with some {) million
people (including some 6 million White Rutlle-
nians); the mixed Ukrainian-Russian territory of
the Northern Caucasus and the lower Volga
arclUl with some 12 million people (including
some 4 million Ukrainians); and part of the
Russian territory in the central and northern
USSR with some 7 million inhabitants.
As far as can be ascertained, the Whit,e
Ruthenian and Russian territories were le8.'4
affected by the evacuations. From an economic
point of view they played a minor role; their
occnpation could not provide the Germans with
any great advantages, burdening them instead
with the responsibility for feeding the popula-
tion; the national consciousnc88 of the White
Ruthenians WlUl not strongly enough developed
to give the Soviets any cause to fear a serious
separatistie movement; that of the Russians,
on the other hand, was strong enough to limit
the danger of their co-operatmg with the
Germans; finally, the w~ed and marshy area
was well suited for partisan activities. Among
the people evacuated from White Ruthenia the
proportion of Jews-of whom a great number
lived there-was probably large.
The situation in the Ukraine and the North-
ern Caucasus was different. Experience has led
Moscow to feel skeptical about the politieal
reliability of their population; moreover, the8e
regions contained the richest agrieultural and
industrial areas of the Union. Hence it was
important to remove as many people-workers
as well as peasants-and as many industrial
plants as possible before the German advance.
Some time ago Izvutiya wrote about "~bose
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day when t·he inhabitants of the l..:krainian
villages and towns moved eastward in a cease-
less stream ... driving cattle and horses
before them and intent upon leaving nothing
behind" (:W.U.-!-l). 1I, can probably be reckoned
t,hat, een on t·he whole, these territories-the
we.~tern parts less than the eastern-lost some
:?o per cent of their population as a result of
eVltcuat,ions during the first year of war. Since
a large proport.ion had moreover, been called
up to t.he army, we can assume that the total
number evacuated from German-occupied ter-
ritory was 12 million-Hi million Ukrainians,
2 million Russians, the rest Jews, White Ruthe-
nians, etc.
(3) Du.ring the German occupation. Up to
the surnnH'r of HH3, when the German troops
Iwgan their large-scale withdra.wa.l from the
Soviet Union, there were, according to German
a,,~ertion~, among the then 7 million foreign
workers in Germanv, some 2 million workers
frum the Soviet U~ion, mostly Ukra.ininns-
not counting the millions of prisoners of war.
(4) ])/l.rillg the German withdrawal. When
the German troops evacuated from the Soviet
l'nion (summer 1942 to nut,umn 1944), a large
part of the populat,ion went with them. There
are no exact figures available. But since the
tot,al number of foreign workers in Germany
rose dllring this period to more than 12 million
and the main proportion of the increase came
from the east, we may assume that the popula,
tion evacuated to the west during the German
withdrawal, including children, amounted to
somt: 7 million people,
A,- a consequence of all four evacuation
waves, t,he population of the German·occupied
territories has thus lost some 21 million, includ-
ing some 17 million Ukrainians and 3 million
Russians. Again it was, as in the prewar
period, the Ukraine which was most badly hit.
When the Red Army marched in again in l!:143/
44, the population of the Ukraine can have
amounted to no more than 50 to 60 per cent
of the prewar population, and probably no
more t.han 15 per cent of t.he men hetween
the ages of Hi and 40.
The Soviet press is full of examples whieh go
to ~how that, our ea.leulation for the evacuation
losses is rather too low than too high:
"We have uE'l'n flying more than half an
hour wit hout seeing a soul. \OVhen we landed
we could not find anybody to . how us the
waL ... The countryside has been turned
into fL de 'ert,," we reatl ill an art,icle in Pravda.
(11.2.4-1) abOllt, conditions in the pro\·i.nce of
Kiev. :\ccurding to :-)O\'iet statements, mure
than IuO,UUO people ha\'e moved away from
each of t,he ('it ies of Kie\' and Dniepropetro\Tsk
as well a" from i he ('rimea in the period lying
between the with<lrawal and the retttrn of the
R,ed Army (L-'fil1'lln, 3.12.-13, 25Jj.-l-l; ]-vesliya,
25.3.""). The pruvince of Cherniguv has "lost
se\'eml hundred thull:;an I people" (KomsfJJI1ol.
skaya Pravda, IGA'-!4). As for the sitnatlon in
the pro\ince of Kharkov, ] :l'est iya wrote
(l!:!.3.4-I): ''There are harilly any people to do
the work in the villages. Indeed, where should
the labor come from, since only old IlH'Il, in-
\'alids, women, amI children llre left!"
WHERE DID TDEY oo'!
In order t,') understand the Soviet situation,
it is of the utmost importance to know where
the Soviets have evacuated these 12 million
people. As the German front was pushed
furthe t east on the southern sector, as well as
from various other indicatiolls, we must assume
that the great majority of the people evacuated
from the northern and central parts were al·
lowed to settle in the provinces immediately to
the east of those parts. On the other hlLnd,
the Soviet press contains many indicat.ions to
the effect that the population evacua,ted from
the Ukraine and the Northern Caucasus was
sent to territories behind the Volga, indeed,
behind the Urals. If we t.ake into account
t.hat some remained in the European Soviet
Union, while others fell victim to the hardships
of the evacuation or were later mobilized for
the Red Army, we arrive at the conclusion
that in 1941/42 some 7 million people, including
some G million Ukrainians, streamed into the
Asiatic part of the Soviet Union.
If we remember that· t.he total number of
people reset.tled in the Asiatic Soviet Union ly
the Bolsheviks up to 1941 amounted to only
some 2t million, we understand the import of
the sudden influx of 7 million new people. To
give an example: the changes wrougbt in
Kazakstan alone are probably somewhat fS
follows. Instead of the 3.G million Kazak~,
not quite 2 million Russians, and 0.5 millicn
Uk'l'ainians inhabit,ing it before the war, there
are now 3.G million Kazaks and about 2 million
Russians and 2 million Ukrainians living there.
In t.his way, the Kazak territory, which was
populated almost solely by KazaKs before the
Bolshevist Revolution, has itself become a
melting pot in which the Kazaks only represent
a minorit.y.
" DESERTERS"
The reader might say that t.his presentation
of the evacuations is merely of academic in,
tereQt" ince they arc obviously measnres caused
by the war and it is to be assumed that every,
thing will return t·o normal after t.be war. Thc
opposite, however, is the case. There is enough
material to proye that the So\-iet Government
regards the evacuations nut as a temporary
measure but as one which is to remain in force
during the postwar period. As long a,~ the
native regions of the evacuees were occupied
by the Germans, the SO\-iet Uovernment did
not have to gi\'e \'oice t.o its intention on this
point. But a. pro\-ince after province callle
under I oviet eOlltrol again, an increasing urge
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to return home made itself felt among the
millions of evacuees, and on September 7, 1944,
the central organ of the Party, Pra'tTda, had to
state in its editorial (and its editorials are as
good a8 laws):
Enterprises with a considerable number of workers,
engineers, and technicians have been evacuated int.Q
t·he Urals, to Siberia, and Central Asia. These enter·
prises will remain there. The people have gone there
not for a day and not for a year. The desire of the
people of Moscow and Leningrad, Kiev and Donbll.8lJ,
Kharkov and Od_, to return t.Q their native cities
is natural. But the interests of the socialist Iltate
demand the maintenance of the evacuated enterprises
in the East.
This is plain speaking, and although this
article seems only to mention industrial workers
there can be hardly any doubt that the ban on
re-evacuation also applies to the peasant popula-
tion. There i.8 no Deed for it to mention them
specifically, as many of them are also employed
in one way or another in industrial work.
There are no indications anywhere in the Soviet
press to show that any evacuated peasanta are
returning from the Asiatic parts of the Soviet
Union in numbers worth mentioning.
Stalin apparently intends to reconstruct the
reoccupied territories without the participation
of the people evacuated from them. That this
cannot be carried out by the people who have
remained-mostlv women, children, and old
men-was already mentioned. So the fact
that the evacuated population is not being
allowed to return can only mean that the
.Party intends to fill up the existing gaps with
people imported from regions of other nation·
ality, perhaps from newly occupied territories.
ONE MORE EVACUATION
Side. by side with the evacuation caused by
the German advance, a second one took place
in territorica not touched by the war. There
lice fJumerous indicationl:l to be found in the
Soviet press and radio to the effect that grow-
ing numbers of people of Turko-Tartar and
Central Asiatic origin are being employed in
the industrica of the Urals and Siberia. The
radio stations of Khabarovsk and Vladivostok
80 frequently mention the presence of Tartar,
Kazak, Tajik, and Uzbek workers in the Soviet
Far East that there must be large groups
there. "In many enterprises o( the Central
Territory, in the Urals, and in Siberia there
are now Kazaks, Tajiks, and Uzbeks working,"
writes Trud, the organ of the Central Trade
Union Council in a leading article (8.6.44).
The Party organs are asked to devote special
attention to them, and complaints have been
raised regarding the fact "that the majority of
them do not speak Russian."
This second proccas of evacuation, which was
not caused by the war, resulted in the Tartar
and Central Asiatic Soviet Republics being
gradually stripped of natives. In the Khirgiz
Republic there were, according to Pravda (18.9.
44), only 252 nati,-e Khirgizes among the G,028
pupils who finished middle school during the,
last four years. In Tajikistan the non·Tajik
population increased to sllch an extent that it
became; necessary to publish several new news-
papers 'in Russian (7.10.44); while in some of
the industries' of Stalinabad' the capital of
Tajikistan, "only a few Tajiks are to be found
among ,the workers" (12.10.44).
So we see that, wllile members of Central
Asiatic tribes are working in the oil fields of
Sakhalin and on the roads of northeastern
Siberia, the industrial development of Central
Asia itself is being carried on largely with the
aid of nonnative workers. A comparison of
the various reports dealing with t.his subject
leads us to assume that about 500,000 people
were eva-euated from the European Soviet
Union to Turkestan. and that approximately
the same number of Tartars, Tajiks., Uzbeks,
Kazaks, etc. were sent from their homes to the
industries of other regions during the war.
DESATIOSALIZATIOS
The melting-pot nature of the BoL'lhevist
population policy manifest during the period
from 1917 to 1941 haa therefore been greatly
emphaaized during the war. ~Ioscow is obvious-
ly determined to bring the process of mixing
the nations and denationalizing them-which
rea-ehed its first climax in the industrialization
and forced collectivization of the thirties-to
completion by the evacuation and resettlement
policy of the fortica, and in particular to settle
the Ukrainian problem once and for all in this
way. Once the Ukrainian problem could be
solved in the Bolshevist sense, all other national
problems within the Soviet Union would lose
much of thcir political significance. The liqui.
dation of this problem within the Soviet borders
must be speciaJly important to Stalin at a time
when the Soviet Union is bringing large ad-
.ditional territories with RCores of millions of
non-Russian inhabitants under its control,
thereby evoking numerous new nationalit,y
problems. The measures of the Soviet Govern-
ment, especially the ban on re-evacuation,
indicate Moscow's desire to fix things in such
a way that after the war there will be no ter·
ritory in which the native inhabitants-the
Ukrainians in the Ukraine, the Kazaks in
Kazakstan-form a majority. They may a160
mean that Stalin intends to employ mass-
evacuations as a means of dealing with t.he
nationality problems in the newly conquered
areas.
OPPOSITION
The fact that Moscow is forced to carry out
such extensive measures affecting the lives of
millions of people is a clear indirect proof of
the strength of the national resistance of non·
Russian peoples to Russian Bolshevism. But
there are also direct proofs of this. We could
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fill pages with quotations from Soviet news-
papers or radio lectures which go to show how
strong the resistance is with which the Bolshe-
viks have met in the reoccupied areas, particu-
larly in the Ukraine and White RuthenJa. At
first they only vented their wrath against
"agenta" allegedly left behind by the Germans
to stir up trouble; but soon they had to admit
that the trouble was caulfed by the population
it8elf.
In an article "On the Propaganda Work in
the Liberated Areas," Propagandist (1944,
No. 14, p. 2) demands intensive politica.) mass
work in the reconquered areas "because their
population, living as it did for a long time
under the conditions of German occupation,
received no genuine Soviet information, and the
enemy tried with the aid of his propaganda to
poison the minds of the Soviet people." The
article admita that it is not easy to carry out
this task. There is, it complains, a lack of
capable agitators-in the provinces of Odesaa
and Kiev, there were only 58 at work instead
of the 430 originally provided for-and, more-
over, among the agitators themselves "a harm-
ful simplification and confusion in the ex-
planation of essential problems" could be
ob8erved.
On September 12, 1944, Colonel General of
Justice Ulrich demanded "incessant watchful-
net18 in the liberated areas" over the .Moeoow
radio. An editorial in Pravda (7.10.44) called
attention to the "disposition toward private
property and against the government" which
the Germans had instilled into the hearts
of the population of the occupied territories.
On October 29, 1944, Tnul wrote: "Not for a
single instant must we forget that workers and
working women are participating in the re-
construction of factories and mines who had
remained behind in the territories temporarily
occupied by the enemy. The German occupa-
tion forces have sown a disposition for private
property there." And on December 19, 1944,
Colonel General Ulrich spoke again over all the
broadcasting stations of the Soviet Union :
"We mUl& reckon with 8pie. and ..boteUl'll in all
branchllll of the 8tate apparatua. They may be in the
Anny, at the front, in the plants, in the government
office8. vilJagee, towna, in the fields. in the hoUBMo
in ahort: everywhere. In the Ukraine then are t.he
OUN [Organization of Ukrainian NationaJiata I Mnda.
They call t.b_l__ Ukrainian nationaliata. We call
them Ulaainian-Oerman Dat.ionaJiata. 1lley under-
take all lUnda of ooupirat.erial work. They are
dangeroua."
Even the latest neW8p&per8 to have arrived
from Moscow contain frequent mention of the
Ukrainian nationaliate and their anti-Soviet
activities. We cannot but ask: if Moecow is
having so much trouble with a population con-
sisting mainly of women, children, and old
men, which lived for about two years under
German occupation and has been under Soviet
rule again for a year or more, what must the
feelings of the Bolshe,,;st l",aders be in looking
fon\'ard to the return of millions of people who
have for years been Ii,'ing on German soil and
working in GNman plants in daily contact wi'h
the German p<'opl"'?
CIIANOES ~ INDUSTRY
The implications of the population changes
during the war become even clearer when we
consider some of the most important changes
in the structure of Soviet economics. For, ill
addition to the millions of people, thousands of
machines were evacuated eastward. And, like
the people, the evacuated factories are also to
remain in the East aft.er the war. Moreover,
the specific gra,;t)· of these eastern regions
has been increased not only as a direct result
of the evacuation of people and machinery but
also because the e,-acuations and the huge
demands of t,he war necessitated a rapid ex·
pansion of the economics of those parts. A
plan recently drawn up for Eastern Siberia
provides for 200 expeditions to be sent out
within the next three vears to make an exact
geological survey. In -addition to the existing
and evacuated factories, many new plants have
been founded. In Soviet Central Asia the
proportion of hea\')' industry in the total in-
dustry has risen from 14.3 per cent (l9-lO) to
almost 50 per cent (1944); and in Turkestan
the proportion of industrial production in total
production, including agriculture, rose from 28
per cent (1925) to 76 per cent in 1944 (Izvutiya,
20.2.44, and Novaya. Ji8'n., 24.12.44).
Bow dependent the old industrial regions
have become on the new ones is shown by the
following assertion: "The old industrial region
[in the western parts of the Soviet Union) will
be reconstructed on the basis of the eastern
regions, which have been conSiderably developed
by the evacuated plants" (BoI.&Mvik, 1944,
No. 19:'20, p. 32). The reconquest of the
western territories will for th" time being not
alter the fact that the Soviet Union's economic
center of gravity haa been shifted almost a
thousand miles toward the east.
REOIO~AL SELF·sunJCIE~CY
Simultaneously with this pr0ce88 of a general
shifting of the, center of gravity toward the
east, another d'evelopment took place. During
the first two decades of Bolshevist rule, one of
the principles of their planned economy was a
far-reaching horizontal distribution of work.
For this purpose, the entire Soviet Union was
at that time looked upon as a single uniform
economic sphere. Each region and, within each
region, eaeh plant was supposed to specialize.
During the last few years, however, this policy
pro"ed to be a dangerous one, for it requires
a smoothly functioning system of transportation
as well as a well-adjusted interplay of all
branches of economy. Both were disrupted by
the war. Furthermore, the decentralization of
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industry-which was formerly concentrated in
comparatively small parts of t.he European
So\·iet Union and is now distributed o\'er the
entire Union, particularly its Asiatic part-has
had a disorganizing effect. Countle!!8 bottle·
necks were created by nonforthcoming deliveries
of machine parts. Even the manufacture of
the simplest things was decentralized; and if
something was forgotten, it could not be ob-
tained because of lacking local facilities:
f'or some time, the ax has been having bad luck in
our industry. The People's CommilllUU'iats for iron
metallurg)', ml&C.hine building, airplane building, arma·
ment manufl\cture, tank manufactur&-they all run
8Wl\~' from tllll ax. "It does not belong to our depart.
ment," the~' 8I\~" At the same time, all t,hese People's
Commissariats without. exception fill out. reams of
papcr every month and ever)' quarter and waste the
energies of the supply department.s to squoow out
axes for their urgent requirements. (Pravda, 5.10.014)
No wonder that the readjustment of the
principal industrial areas to regional self·
sufficiency is now being demanded, and that
even individual enterprises are being urged to
do everything po!!8ible to cover their own
requirementl:l. So the horizontal structure is
to be replaced by a vertical one, which the
Soviets, in order to avoid using the word
"autarchy," have given the nice new name of
··universali!!m." The same applies to the con-
sUlner.goods industry as well as to the numerous
small industrial plants producing certain spare
pa.rts or simple implements for large enterprises
aud which are now being oriented toward the
individual economic regions rather than the
market of the entire Union (/zvesl,:ya" 26.10 and
28.11.44).
Even in the field of agriculture and food supply
this trend toward regional aut,archy is making
it.sell felt. Owing to the loss of t,he rich Black
Earth zone and the shortage in means of trans-
portation, the Soviet Government has since the
spring of 1942 been corll~tantly urging the
industrial plants to make themselves self·
sufficient as far a.'i possible with regard to the
obtaining of food supplies. Thrce years ago
this magazine ("The USSR Faces Spring,"
~Iay 1942) drew attention to the early stages
of this trend. In the meantime the "auxiliary
farms" have grown to 50,000; this has, of
course, the disadvantage t.hat the industrial
workers have to spend more time at. agricultural
work. The metal workers of the Kuzbass, the
lRrge industrial basin in central Siberia, recently
declared that by means of t,hese auxiliary farms
they were able to cover all their requirements
in potatoos and vegetables. In addition to
this, workers' families are being urged to cul-
tivate small vegetable gardens (called ogorody)
on their own. At present there are said to be
ome 10 million of these oyorody.
F.GOTISTIO KOLKIIOZES
During and after the RcYolut,ion, the village
soviets (village councils), i.e., the lowest ad·
ministrative units, formed the main instrument
of the Bolshevist peasant policy. Later, partic.
ularly during the war years, the village soviets
were completely overshadowed by the !rol.
kJwzu .,(collective farms), of which there are
usually several within the area of a village
soviet; the Government, urgently in need of
bread, went over the heads of the village !!oviets
and applied directly,to the /colkJwzea. In the
ten years of their existence the /colkJwzu had
consolidated themselves; and in economic 11.8
well as political respects the importance of the
kolkhoz chiefs waxed, while the deputies of the
village soviet had less and less to do and say.
It was partioularly the Government organ
Izvestiya which frequently drew attention to
this fact. It wrote that "during the war years
the contact between the deputies and the
voters has been disturbed" (2i .12.44-), or com-
plained that the heads of the county soviets
often did not even know the names of the
heads of the village soviets (20.10.44-), that the
heads of many village soviets had neither paper
nor writing material (30.6.44), and that there
was so little interest for their work that only
third. or fourth-rate people were prepared to
accept posta in them. And all this in spite of
the fact that, according to Article :J of the
Constitution, "all the power in the USSR
belongs to the workers in the towns and
in the country in the person of the soviet
deputies."
So the "dialectics of development" forced
the Party for economic reasons to carry out
measures which had grave political consequences.
The IcolkJwzu developed into commuDit.ies
which placed the requirements of their own
memhers above the interests of the state and
began to show a tendency toward leading their
own political life. }lore and more complaints
were to be heard about the "lcolk1acY'..u' t.raitorou8
tendencies"; the latter found expression in the
attitude of numeroUB kolkhozu which sought by
every poesible me&llll, including sheer fraud, to
circumvent the compulsory delivery of grain,
or neglected to fulfill other demands of the
Government in order to protect their own
members,
Consequently, an increase in the authority of
the village soviets hl18 since last autumn becn
one of the main features of internal politicul
interest in the USSR. It is being demanded
in numerous articles and radio speeches. The
President of the Soviet Union, Kalinin, rleclen-d
t.hat the independence of the kolklwzu must be
limited to economic questions and tha.t all
political.administrative questions concerned
only the village soviets, which should im.
mediately he reorganized in such a way o.~ to
enable them to control even the smaUest dc-
tails of peasant life. It remains to be seen
to what extent these mea.sures wiU reverse
the advanced process of acquiring independence
on t.he part of the kolkhoze8.
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"MA:-A .ERiAL ltEVOLUTION"
III one more respect a de"c1opment toward
local self.sufficiency can be ob. er\'Cd: the
growing independence of individual plants
with regard to manag ment, labor questions.
wa es etc. All article in Prat·da (5.G.4-1) de·
mallds an expansion of the rights of the factof)
h ad. For the sake of greater effici('ncy and
working disciplille, the mallager is in future to
be allowed to fix the 1l1.lluber position, and
snlary of the worker !llltl employee:! of his
plant and is to be given the right to di miss
workers without consulting the supen-ising
authoriticR.
111 his w ·Il·known book The Mallagerial
Ret'ollliioll, James Burnham wrote' three years
1l1l0 that tho world was progressing toward a
"re\'olution of the managers." H outlined
the- work f the manager as follows:
'1'110 eli\' 'rKo tl ...~ks of the tcdlllicni rlirootion and
,·o·ordinal iOIl of tho proc(\l<.'! of protillel iOIl Illllst bo
orl'(lllliu·d, co·ordinate<!. 80 that tho different rna·
I,'riols. t 018. mochine8. pltmts. workers ar nil o\'sil·
nblc at tho proper placo and moment anti ill the proper
1l11lnbers. Tlli" task of di,,'clion IUld co·ordinal ion is
il~c1f n III 'hly ~p 'ciolized function.
Jt, i~ not only in economic but also in political
respects that the futun' belongs to tht' manag·
er-. think Burnham. And a kindrcd iuea. i ex·
pre sed by I~mt"'a when it writ(' (5.7.44): "The
intere t f our state demand that th head of
1\ fnctory Ilhould become a real socialist mast.er
lklto.:oil/·] of his enterpri:;e." It is interesting
thnt thelie utterly uncommunistic iueutl. besides
lx:ing 'xpr '.·I<ed 'in the coillmns of the central
urgan of the Communist I~arty, arc being
pu. hcd by the SO\Tiet manager<"o themselves who,
probably without exception are memb 'rs of the
J'arty.
The re8ult of all the8e develupments in
'oviet economics is a double trend toward self·
tiuflicienc,·. The first tends toward self·suffi·
ciency of 'tbe indi,-iduul plunt, kolkllO:, manager,
or even worker; the se ond-and this is par·
ticularly important for tho understanding of the
great,er iSlllles-toward tho self-sufficiency of
y:triou largo economic 8pheres. Those men·
tioned again and again in 'o\'iet literature-in
indu trial as well as agricultural re8pects-are
the liralli, Western Siberia/Altai, Kuzakstan,
Tllrke tnn, and Eastern Siberia.
B.\CK-DOOH :\EWUHORS
One consequence of the eastward shift of
the cent, I' of gravity i cxtremely interesting
for it future implications: tbe effect it is having
on the relntiontl between the So\iet 'nion und
the l SA. History ha' shown in general that
the furth('r apart two nations are, the more
friendly do they feel toward ench other. E'-en
llcfore the pre cnt allianc betweeu \\ a hington
and 1\Ioscow, it has been pointed out in ArneI'·
ican literatnre and U1any a speech that America
allll Ru' ill. could easily co·ordinate their world
P licic , as their territori(' lay far apnrt and
thcir intere ts hardl..- c Hided from a eo·
grapbical point of view, And it wa praised
as a great blessing that the Russians had sold
Ala. kn to the . A and had therebv withdmwn
fr m the .-\merican continent. A' a re lilt the
U!'U and th V,"R were eparated until
re ('otlv on th one side bv tho Atlanti an I
on the 'other bv the Pacific:
The fact tlHlt the American and Asiatic eon·
tinents almost tou h in the Xorth Paciti W8
of no account u" long u, northe tern Siberia
between th(' Lena Ri\'er and the Bering Strait.
un arca larger than \r stern and 'entral Europe
put together. consisted of frozen wa_h's ill
which no one livcd but flomc primitive lIat.i\·es
and a handful of Russian officials and fur
hunters. Toda v, howc\'er, t he scene has under·
gone a radical cilange. A development initiated
in the carl\' thirtie;- has been t,remcndoul'lv
8]) edeu up "dming the war und in conue ·tio;)
with the mas!' evucuations: the opening up of
northeru tern ·iberia. which the BolshevikI'! call
t.h('ir Far Xorth. Hitherto this de\'elopment
wal'! hidden behilld a vcil of military Cl'l't.' v,
but quite rec-cntly "ariolls details Ilave beell
pu bli. hed in the SO\'iet, pr(,~l; ulld ovcr the
radio which permit u to gain some idca f
what ha been happening there.
F.\I< :\OHTII
~Iilgadan (shown in thc Illap of, 'iberia priutl'd
in 'Tile XXth • 1I111ry of January Hl44), th('
largest and 1I10st important s It lement of the
Far ~orth. i not to be found e\'en on new
'o\'iet mailS. Th town is situated on tbe
•og8)'e\'0 Bay-about 150~ ea· tern longitude-
whi h form the best harbur un tb 'ell of
Okhotsk. Since there is not yet any overland
connection suited for large transports, Mllglldan r
whieh is connected by 'hip with the Alllur
region forms th gateway to the Far lIiorth.
It is here that the "Kolyma Highway" tart,;:.
which crosses the high coastal runge and follow'
the valley of the KoIYllll\ Rivor to Amburehik.
nt, the mouth of the KoIYIIlf\. on the Areti
Ocean; this highway represents the vital artery
of the Far Xorth. A travel report publi. hed
not long agn in 1::.1' Miya (10. and 13.9.44) t Ib
us that roa I houses or settlements hayc been
built e\'ery t went." to thirt,y kilometers along
the highway Gild describes some of tho lurger
settlements which ha\'c dC\'eloped on th·
mineral reo our of the Kolyma region. The
author report. that pile. of rubble from the
mine line both sid of the highway for mile
on end. The center of the new mining area iii
Orotukan, where a steel works has recently
l>een opened and where Ulllchine parts for the
mini.ug industry are produced in order to . a\'e
the long, cumbersome tran. portation fr 111 the
western parts of the Soviet Union. Electro·
technical work. hops in Atka supply th Far
North with ell'ctric motor and transformer".
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There are automobile workshops in Magadan.
The nonnative population is increasing rapidly
probably due to compulsory evacuations from
the west. Not many Soviet citizens would
move to the Far North on their own initiative;
it is among the coldest regions of the earth,
wrapped for many months in polar night, and
whipped by arctic snowstorms. The food prob-
lem is particularly difficult. In 1940 almost all
food, some 40,000 tons, had still to be im-
ported. Meanwhile, the population has grown,
while the food and transport situation of the
rest of the Soviet Union has been strained to
the utmost. Hence, whether they liked it or
not, the inhabitants of the Far North had to
start their own agriculture, in view of the
climate a very thankless task. Two feet under
the surface, the earth is frozen summer and
winter, and the farming season is limited to the
short summer which, although intense, is inter-
rupted by occasional night frosts.
No one doubts that the Soviets will keep on
with their development of the Far North even
after the war. America is now confronted
with an entirely new situation: the vacuum
lying between her and the Soviet Union has
been filled with energy. Men like Wendell
Willkie and Henry Wallace have had an oppor-
tunity to find this out for themselves during
their journeys through Eastern Siberia. The
man in the street in America has, of course,
not yet become aware of this change. The
people in Alaska were the first to grow
alarmed, and we can be sure that the rapid
opening up of Alaska during the last few years
was, in part at least, a reply to the develop-
ments in the Soviet Far North. America has
even offered the Finns the chance of settling
in Alaska. Perhaps she believes that the Finns,
who have for so long proved themselves as
sturdy guards on the western border of Russia,
might be able to undertake this job on the
easternmost border of Stalin's empire too, in
which America is much more interested. Of
course, the Finns would have to consider
whether it would be worth their while to move
to the other side of the world. If the Russians
lay historical claim to .Finland, they can do it
equally well to Alaska; for, while Finland was
under Tsarist rule for 108 years,All}Ska was under
Russian control for 127 yeal"ll (1~0-1867).
..
COXCLUSIOX
The demographic and economic developments
which we have discussed in this article have
without doubt aided the Soviets in carrying on
the war; but have they brought them any closer
to the solution of their actual national and
economic problems?
(1) We have seen how strong the anti.
Bolshevist sentiment 8tiU is among the non-
Russian nationalities. If, according to their
own testimony, the Soviets are having so much
trouble with the Ukrainians who are stiU in the
Ukraine, it is not likely that those who have
been evacuated to Siberia have, through this
additional hardship, grown more pro-Bolshevik.
To be sure, in the Ukraine itself there are far
fewer Ukrainians today than some years ago;
but their numbers have increased in the other
parts of the country, and they have carried
their sentiments toward Bolshevism with them.
Throughout the Bols~evist period it was shown
time and again that.~ the Russians are by far
the most reliable element from the Bolshevist
point of view; but the percentage of Russians
in the population of the Asiatic part of the
USSR has decreased. The following table,
which lays no claim to complete accuracy but
gives an approximate idea, shows this:
Composition of tbe Population of the Asiatic
Soviet Union (excluding Transcaucasia)
in per ceq.t.
RUIJIJia1UJ UkrainiatllJ OthulJ
1940 50 10 40
1945* 35 25 40
*after deducting mobilization
From the pages of the Soviet press we learn
that, the smaller the percentage of RU88ians,
the greater are the Bolsheviks' troubles. Among
the regions mentioned most frequently as being
politically unreliable and economically in-
efficient, we find more often than not territories
with a strong non-Russian population and such
as have been flooded with evacuees-the
Bashkir and Tartar Republics, Western Siberia,
Kazakstan, Central Asia. And it is an in-
teresting fact that the troubles the Bolsheviks
are having with the k.Qlkhozes and soviets
are also particularly acute in these areas.
(2) In the economic sphere we have found
a trend toward regional and local selfsufficiency.
The territory behind the Urals as a whole
as well as some of its individual parts have
during the last few years become largely self.
sufficient in economics and preponderantly non-
Russian in population. These territories have
great prospects of economic development and
represent entities of their own. At present
this may be of no importance; but nothing
is permanent, and new situations will arise in
which the vast increase in non-Russian and
less-Bolshevist population and the growing
regional selfsufficiency of certain parts of the
USSR may attain far.reaching importance.
The Bolsheviks love the "dialectics of devel·
opment." They are always eager to convince
themselves and others of how the laws of dia·
lectics are working in their favor. But these
laws were not written in the Kremlin. They
have a logic of their own, and it is due to them
that what the Bolsheviks have undertaken
during the war to strengthen their economio
and political position also contains dangers for
themselves. To understand the present situa-
tion and future trends of the USSR one must
know not only the Bolshevist theses but also the
antitheses advanced by the historical process.
